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Douglas R. Richmond* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The designation “client” is significant in several aspects of the law.1  
As a matter of evidence law it is the client who holds the attorney-client 
privilege.  With rare exception only clients may sue lawyers for 
malpractice.  Lawyers are fiduciaries to their clients.  When it comes to 
professional responsibility law, the term “client” has special meaning.2  
“Although it is true that lawyers may owe some duties to third persons 
who are not clients, and to the legal system and the law generally, the 
most basic duties run to clients.”3  It is clients to whom lawyers owe 
continuing duties of loyalty and confidentiality. 
Lawyers sometimes represent more than one client in a matter.  A 
lawyer may represent a second client as an accommodation to the 
lawyer’s regular client to avoid duplication of effort and the 
                                                          
 
*
 Partner, Armstrong Teasdale LLP, Kansas City, Missouri.  B.S., Fort Hays State University; 
M.Ed., University of Nebraska; J.D., University of Kansas.  The views expressed here are the 
author’s alone.  This Article sometimes uses the masculine pronoun “he” for simplicity’s sake; it 
does not evidence gender bias. 
 1. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a client as “[a] person or entity that employs a 
professional for advice or help in that professional’s line of work.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 247 
(7th ed. 1999).  This definition is flawed in the context of a person’s or entity’s relationship with an 
attorney because it suggests that client status depends on payment for the professional’s advice or 
help.  The existence of an attorney-client relationship, however, does not turn on payment for the 
attorney’s services.  “The attorney’s right to be compensated for his advice and services arises from 
[the attorney-client] relationship; it is not the definitional basis of that relationship.”  Macomb 
County Taxpayers Ass’n v. L’Anse Creuse Pub. Schs., 564 N.W.2d 457, 462 (Mich. 1997).  Rather, 
“[a]n attorney-client relationship is created when a person seeks advice or assistance from an 
attorney, the advice or assistance sought pertains to matters within the attorney’s professional 
competence, and the attorney expressly or impliedly agrees to give or actually gives the desired 
advice or assistance.”  Richardson v. Griffiths, 560 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Neb. 1997). 
 2. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 2.1 
(3d ed. 2001). 
 3. Id. 
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accompanying expense.4  For example, a lawyer may regularly represent 
an organization and, in a case in which the organization and one of its 
officers are named as defendants, also represent the officer.  If a conflict 
later develops between the organization and the officer, the lawyer may 
seek to withdraw from the officer’s representation but continue to 
represent the organization on the theory that the officer was a mere 
“accommodation client” who understood and impliedly consented to this 
arrangement.  A similar situation may arise where a lawyer represents 
two corporate defendants in a suit, one of which is the lawyer’s regular 
client and the true target, and accordingly controls the litigation, and the 
other corporation is sued because its joinder gives the plaintiff some 
strategic advantage or is otherwise necessary.  The lawyer may consider 
the non-target defendant to be only an accommodation client.  
Alternatively, a lawyer may want to take on a new case in which he 
would be adverse to a current client in a different matter.  If the facts 
permit, he might argue that because the current client is merely an 
accommodation client, he can drop that representation and litigate 
against the former accommodation client on behalf of his new client.5  
“Accommodation client” status is most likely to be claimed where the 
lawyer has long represented the regular client, the accommodation 
client’s representation is of limited duration or scope, and the 
accommodation client allegedly has no reasonable expectation that the 
lawyer will keep his confidences from the regular client.6 
Accommodation clients typically are the creation of lawyers facing 
possible disqualification in litigation, although professional discipline 
and malpractice liability may also be concerns.  They are also the 
creation of courts who believe that slavish adherence to conflict of 
interest rules sometimes produces unfair results in disqualification 
disputes.  Ethics rules do not distinguish between “primary” clients and 
accommodation clients.7  Clients are clients.  Or are they? 
II.  APPLICABLE ETHICS RULES 
Conflicts of interest are at the heart of accommodation client claims 
and disputes.  Most jurisdictions regulate conflicts under the American 
                                                          
 4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132 cmt. i (2000) 
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
 5. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449, 453-55 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (discussing expert opinion offered by Professor Charles W. Wolfram). 
 6. RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at § 132 cmt. i. 
 7. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Westergren, 794 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tex. App. 1990). 
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Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.8  Model Rule 
1.7 addresses conflicts of interest involving current clients, or concurrent 
representations.  The rule provides: 
 
(a)  A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client will be adverse to another 
client, unless: 
(1)  the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not adversely affect the relationship with the other 
client; and 
(2)  each client consents after consultation. 
(b)  A lawyer shall not represent a client if the 
representation of that client may be materially limited by 
the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a third 
person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless: 
(1)  the lawyer reasonably believes the representation 
will not be adversely affected; and 
(2)  the client consents after consultation.  When 
representation of multiple clients in a single matter is 
undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation of the 
implications of the common representation and the 
advantages and risks involved.9 
 
Rule 1.7 applies when the representation of a client is directly 
adverse to another client,10 when a client’s representation would be 
materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to 
a third person,11 and when a client’s representation may be materially 
                                                          
 8. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2001) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
 9. Id. at Rule 1.7. 
 10. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Mastrilli, 614 So. 2d 1081, 1082 (Fla. 1993) (suspending lawyer 
for violating Rule 1.7(a) by suing a current client); In re Horine, 661 N.E.2d 1206, 1207 (Ind. 1996) 
(reprimanding lawyer for violating Rule 1.7(a) by negotiating the sale of a client’s car to another 
client without first obtaining the purchaser’s consent to the representation); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Whitnall, 619 N.W.2d 926, 928, 930 (Wis. 2000) (holding that lawyer violated 
Rule 1.7(a) by representing both wife and husband in divorce proceedings); In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Ratzel, 578 N.W.2d 194, 195-98 (Wis. 1998) (holding that attorney violated 
Rule 1.7(a) by representing both personal representative of estate and claimants). 
 11. See, e.g., In re Shannon, 876 P.2d 548, 553-58 (Ariz. 1994) (holding that lawyer violated 
Rule 1.7(b) when he represented two defendants with conflicting interests in civil case), modified on 
other grounds, 890 P.2d 602 (Ariz. 1994); People v. Ginsberg, 967 P.2d 151, 153 (Colo. 1998) 
(suspending lawyer who prepared loan documents in transaction in which both borrower and lender 
were his clients); In re Geeding, 12 P.3d 396, 400-02 (Kan. 2000) (censuring lawyer who 
simultaneously represented mortgage defendants and company which specialized in locating and 
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limited by the lawyer’s own interests.12  Rule 1.7(a) forbids concurrent 
adverse representations even where the opposing clients’ matters are 
wholly unrelated.13  The rule thus recognizes the basic principle that a 
lawyer’s duty of loyalty is indivisible.14 
A lawyer may accept or continue a representation in the shadow of 
Rule 1.7 with his clients’ consent if he reasonably believes that he can 
fulfill his professional obligations to the clients notwithstanding his 
competing interests or obligations.  The “reasonable belief” 
requirements in Rules 1.7(a) and (b) make clear that the standard by 
which a lawyer must gauge his fidelity is an objective one.15 
While Rule 1.7(a) prohibits concurrent adverse representations even 
in unrelated matters, Rule 1.7(b) is not so limiting.  Rule 1.7(b) focuses 
on the extent to which the quality of the lawyer’s representation will be 
lessened by competing interests.  The rule thus permits simultaneous 
representation of opposing interests in unrelated matters on the right 
facts.16  As a general rule, however, a lawyer who finds himself 
representing adverse interests in violation of Rule 1.7 must, in the 
absence of consent, withdraw from both representations.17  The lawyer 
may not cure the problem “simply by dropping the disfavored client like 
a ‘hot potato.’”18 
Rule 1.9 addresses conflicts of interest in consecutive 
                                                          
selling foreclosed properties); Barkley v. City of Detroit, 514 N.W.2d 242, 247-48 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1994) (holding that Rule 1.7(b) prevented attorney from city’s law department from representing 
both the city and one of its employees in tort action). 
 12. See, e.g., In re Personal Restraint of Stenson, 16 P.3d 1, 17 (Wash. 2001) (explaining that 
the reference to a “lawyer’s own interest” in Rule 1.7(b) “denotes a financial or familial interest or 
an interest arising out of the lawyer’s exposure to culpability”). 
 13. Daniels v. State, 17 P.3d 75, 81 (Alaska Ct. App. 2001). 
 14. See Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 P.2d 950, 953 (Cal. 1994) (stating that “[a]n attorney’s 
duty of loyalty to a client is not one that is capable of being divided”); Barkley, 514 N.W.2d at 246 
(stating that “[a]n attorney owes undivided allegiance to a client”); Schuff v. A.T. Klemens & Son, 
16 P.3d 1002, 1012 (Mont. 2000) (expressing the “fundamental principle that an attorney, as a 
fiduciary, owes a duty of undivided loyalty to his or her client”). 
 15. People v. Mason, 938 P.2d 133, 136 (Colo. 1997); see, e.g., Robertson v. Wittenmyer, 763 
N.E.2d 804, 807-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that lawyer could not have reasonably believed 
that representation of one client against another was permissible and affirming trial court’s 
disqualification order). 
 16. See, e.g., Jaggers v. Shake, 37 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Ky. 2001) (holding that there was no 
Rule 1.7(b) conflict because there was no showing that the lawyers’ representations would be 
materially limited). 
 17. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, LEGAL ETHICS § 8-5 (2000). 
 18. Id. (quoting Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc. 670 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ohio 
1987)); see also infra notes 138-41 and the accompanying text. 
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representations; it is intended to protect former clients.19  An attorney’s 
loyalty to his client survives the termination of the attorney-client 
relationship.20  Were it otherwise, a lawyer might be tempted to 
terminate a representation and use his former client’s confidences to 
make himself more valuable to a new client who is adverse to the first.  
One of the primary aims of Rule 1.9, then, is the protection of client 
confidences.21  Rule 1.9(a) provides: 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not 
thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related 
matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the 
interests of the former client unless the former client consents after 
consultation.22 
The scope of a “matter” for Rule 1.9(a) purposes depends on the 
facts of the particular case.23  Determining whether successive matters 
are “substantially related” likewise requires an analysis of the facts, the 
circumstances, and the legal issues involved.24  The greater the 
similarities between the facts and the legal issues, the greater the chance 
that the two representations will be deemed to be substantially related.  
The nature and extent of the attorney’s involvement in the two cases can 
also be a significant factor.25  Once matters are determined to be 
substantially related, the attorney’s receipt of confidential information 
from the client is presumed.26 
                                                          
 19. 1 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 2, § 13.2. 
 20. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 303 (5th 
ed. 1998). 
 21. See Griffith v. Taylor, 937 P.2d 297, 301 (Alaska 1997) (stating that the Rule 1.9(a) 
substantial relationship test is a prophylactic rule obviating the former client’s need to demonstrate 
the disclosure of confidential information in the prior representation); Flatt v. Superior Court, 885 
P.2d 950, 954 (Cal. 1994) (stating that “the chief fiduciary value jeopardized [in successive 
representations] is that of client confidentiality”). 
 22. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, at Rule 1.9(a).  “Another person” as used in Rule 1.9(a) 
means “another client.”  Wood’s Case, 634 A.2d 1340, 1342-43 (N.H. 1993). 
 23. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, at Rule 1.9 cmt. 2; see, e.g., Misemer v. Freda’s Restaurant, 
Inc., 961 S.W.2d 120, 122-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). 
 24. See Fox Searchlight Pictures, Inc. v. Paladino, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 912 (Ct. App. 
2001); Schwartz v. Cortelloni, 685 N.E.2d 871, 878-80 (Ill. 1997); State v. Crepeault, 704 A.2d 778, 
783 (Vt. 1997) (quoting State ex rel. McClanahan v. Hamilton, 430 S.E.2d 569, 572-73 (W. Va. 
1993)). 
 25. San Gabriel Basin Water Quality Auth. v. Aerojet-General Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 
1103-04 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (quoting H.F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Salomon Bros., Inc., 280 Cal. Rptr. 
614 (Ct. App. 1991)); Fox Searchlight, 106 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912. 
 26. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. K.A.W., 575 So. 2d 630, 632-34 (Fla. 1991) (holding 
that presumption is irrefutable); Robertson v. Wittenmyer, 736 N.E.2d 804, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000); Chrispens v. Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 897 P.2d 104, 114 (Kan. 1995) (holding that 
5
Richmond: Accommodation Clients
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2002
RICHMOND1.DOC 1/8/02  1:29 PM 
64 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1 
 
Rule 1.9(a) also requires that the current and former clients’ 
interests be “materially adverse” in order to force the lawyer’s 
disqualification.27  In other words, not all competing interests are 
conflicts of interest for Rule 1.9(a) purposes; an actual conflict does not 
arise until the material adversity requirement is met.28  Again, the 
determination of whether current and former clients’ interests are 
materially adverse requires case-specific inquiry.29 
A few states adhere to the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility.30  The Model Code governs lawyers’ conduct by way of 
general axiomatic norms referred to as “Canons,” aspirational standards 
referred to as “Ethical Considerations” (“EC’s”), and “black letter” 
requirements known as “Disciplinary Rules” ( “DR”).  The Model Code 
addresses conflicts of interest under Canon 5, which generally requires 
lawyers to exercise independent professional judgment on their clients’ 
behalf.31  DR 5-101(A) is the Model Code’s basic conflict of interest 
provision.  It provides: 
 
DR 5-101 Refusing Employment When the Interests of 
the Lawyer May Impair His Independent Professional 
Judgment. 
(A)Except with the consent of his client after full 
disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the 
exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client 
will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial 
                                                          
presumption is irrebuttable); Sullivan County Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist. v. Town of Acworth, 686 
A.2d 755, 758 (N.H. 1996) (holding that presumption is irrebuttable); Crepeault, 704 A.2d at 783; 
State ex rel. McClanahan v. Hamilton, 430 S.E.2d 569, 573 (W. Va. 1993); In re Guardianship of 
Tamara L.P., 503 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that presumption is irrebuttable). 
 27. Sullivan County, 686 A.2d at 757; see, e.g., Straub Clinic & Hosp. v. Kochi, 917 P.2d 
1284, 1291 (Haw. 1996). 
 28. See, e.g., Fiddelman v. Redmon, 623 A.2d 1064, 1070 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993) (holding 
that trial court did not err in refusing to disqualify lawyer partly because successive representations 
were not adverse). 
 29. Although it never mentioned Rule 1.9(a), the court in Hunter v. State, 770 So. 2d 232 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000), summed up the substantial relationship and material adversity 
requirements well: “[T]here is no blanket continuing duty of loyalty by the mere fact of some 
representation which translates to automatic disqualification any time the prior client is in any way 
involved in a subsequent case.  Each case must be reviewed on its specific facts and circumstances.”  
Id.
 at 235. 
 30. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1986) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. 
 31. Id. at Canon 5 (“A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf 
of a Client”). 
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business, property, or personal interests.32 
 
DR 5-101(A) is augmented by DR 5-105(C), which provides that “a 
lawyer may represent multiple clients if it is obvious that he can 
adequately represent the interest of each and if each consents to the 
representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such 
representation on the exercise of such representation on the exercise of 
his professional judgment on behalf of each.”33  As with Model Rule 1.7, 
courts interpreting DR 5-101(A) and (C) must balance the lawyer’s duty 
of loyalty to the client, the lawyer’s economic interests, and the public’s 
interest in the availability of legal services.  Such balancing seldom 
favors the lawyer, however, as concurrent adverse representations are 
presumptively improper.34 
The Model Code has no direct counterpart to Model Rule 1.9(a).35  
In Model Code states, conflicts of interest in successive representations 
are prohibited under DR 4-101, which requires attorneys to preserve 
clients’ confidences and secrets, and under Canon 9, which obligates 
attorneys to avoid even the appearance of impropriety.36  EC 9-2 
provides that “[w]hen explicit ethical guidance does not exist, a lawyer 
should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that promotes 
confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the 
legal profession.”37  A court might also invoke DR 5-105(C) to 
discipline a lawyer for a conflict of interest in successive 
                                                          
 32. Id. at DR 5-101. 
 33.  Id. at DR 5-105(C). 
 34. Hatfield v. Seville Centrifugal Bronze, 732 N.E.2d 1077, 1080 (Ohio Misc. 2000) (stating 
that “[s]imultaneous representation is prima facie improper”). 
 35. See Adoption of Erica, 686 N.E.2d 967, 970 & n.3 (Mass. 1997) (explaining that 
analyzing conflicts in successive representations is difficult in Model Code states because the Model 
Code
 does not specifically address the issue, and noting that Model Rule 1.9 explicitly addresses 
former client conflicts).  A few Model Code states have formulated their own disciplinary rules akin 
to Model Rule 1.9(a).  See, e.g., Kassis v. Teacher’s Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 717 N.E.2d 674, 677 n.* 
(N.Y. 1999).  New York’s DR 5-108 prohibits an attorney “‘who has represented the former client 
in a matter’ from ‘represent[ing] another person in the same or a substantially related matter in 
which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client’ unless the 
former client consents.”  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting the rule). 
 36. See Bergeron v. Mackler, 623 A.2d 489, 493 n.9 (Conn. 1993).  With limited exceptions 
DR 4-101(B) provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly reveal a client’s confidence or secret, use a 
client’s confidence or secret to the client’s disadvantage, or use a client’s confidence or secret for 
the advantage of himself or a third person unless the client consents after full disclosure.  See 
MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at DR 4-101(B).  Canon 9 states succinctly: “A Lawyer Should Avoid 
Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety.”  Id. at Canon 9. 
 37. Id. at EC 9-2. 
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representations.38 
The Model Code and Rule 1.9(a) standards for disqualification are 
similar.39  The successive matters must be substantially related; 
successive representations pose no ethical problems in the absence of a 
substantial relationship between the matters.40  If the matters are 
substantially related, Model Code states also presume that confidences 
have passed.41  The problem in the Model Code analysis is the meaning 
and significance of a claimed “appearance of professional impropriety” 
under Canon 9.  This is at best an imprecise measure of attorney 
conduct.  The appearance of impropriety, standing alone, generally 
should be insufficient to disqualify an attorney in a dispute stemming 
from successive representations.42 
III.  CASES 
The case most often cited to support an accommodation client 
theory is Allegaert v. Perot,43 decided by the Second Circuit.  Winthrop 
Allegaert was the trustee in bankruptcy of Walston, once a large Wall 
Street brokerage firm.  He moved to disqualify two law firms, Weil, 
Gotshal and Leva, Hawes, who represented some of the defendants in a 
preference action brought by Allegaert.  The preference action arose out 
of Walston’s realignment with another struggling brokerage, DGF, in 
what amounted to a joint venture.44  Weil, Gotshal and Leva, Hawes had 
                                                          
 38. See, e.g., In re Conduct of Sawyer, 13 P.3d 112, 113 (Or. 2000). 
 39. See Bergeron, 623 A.2d at 493. 
 40. See Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 688 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ohio 1998). 
 41. See Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 603 N.W.2d 772, 
777-78 (Iowa 1999); Clinard v. Blackwood, 46 S.W.3d 177, 184 (Tenn. 2001). 
 42. See Bergeron, at 494 (Conn. 1993); State v. Reddick, 534 S.E.2d 473, 479 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2000) (quoting Reese v. Georgia Power Co., 381 S.E.2d 110 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)), vacated by 546 
S.E.2d 68 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Dimaplas, 978 P.2d 891, 893-94 (Kan. 1999) (quoting In re 
Estate of Koch, 849 P.2d 977 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993)); Adoption of Erica, 686 N.E.2d 967, 973 
(Mass. 1997); Hatfield v. Seville Centrifugal Bronze, 732 N.E.2d 1077, 1081 (Ohio Misc. 2000); 
Stowell v. Bennett, 739 A.2d 1210, 1212 (Vt. 1999).  But see Lovell v. Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 
466, 469 (Ky. 1997) (reasoning that the appearance of impropriety remains an independent basis for 
disqualification because it serves to protect the reasonable expectations of current and former 
clients, and because it promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession); Brown v. 
Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 14 P.3d 1266, 1269 n.4 (Nev. 2000) (observing that an attorney’s 
“disqualification may be warranted if an appearance of unfairness or impropriety is great enough to 
undermine public trust and confidence in the judicial system”); Clinard, 46 S.W.3d at 186-89 
(retaining the appearance of impropriety as an independent basis for disqualification in order to 
protect client confidences and to assure the public of the integrity of the legal profession). 
 43. Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 44. Id. at 248-49. 
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represented DGF and other interested parties related to DGF in the 
Walston-DGF realignment.45  Weil, Gotshal and Leva, Hawes had 
thereafter represented Walston in a derivative action known as Nella 
Walston, which was substantially similar to the case at bar.46  In both 
cases Allegaert alleged that payments made by Walston to DGF were 
unlawful preferences, and that DGF had otherwise defrauded and looted 
DWI through their alignment.47  Allegaert based his disqualification 
motion on Weil, Gotshal’s and Leva, Hawes’ representation of Walston 
in the Nella Walston litigation.  The district court declined to disqualify 
the law firms and Allegaert took an interlocutory appeal. 
The Allegaert court noted the basic rule that an attorney may be 
disqualified if he accepts an engagement adverse to a former client’s 
interests and the new engagement is substantially related to the prior 
matter.48  Once the substantial relationship is established the attorney’s 
receipt of the former client’s confidences is presumed.  Before the 
substantial relationship test is implicated, however, it must be shown 
that the attorney could have received information which his former client 
might reasonably believe that he would withhold from the current 
client.49 
The court reasoned that the substantial relationship did not apply 
because Walston knew that information given to Weil, Gotshal and 
Leva, Hawes “would certainly be conveyed to their primary clients,” 
i.e., DGF and its affiliates, in view of the realignment agreement.50  
Neither Walston nor anyone associated with it reasonably could have 
believed that Weil, Gotshal and Leva, Hawes would withhold from DGF 
and its affiliates information shared with the law firms by Walston.51  
Walston always had the law firm of Shearman & Sterling as its own 
counsel and, with the exception of the Nella Walston litigation, Weil, 
Gotshal and Leva, Hawes always represented DGF and its affiliates.52  
As the court explained: 
 
Integral to our conclusion that Weil, Gotshal and Leva, 
Hawes were not positioned to receive information intended 
                                                          
 45. Id. at 248. 
 46. Id. at 249. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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to be withheld from DGF is the law firms’ continuous and 
unbroken legal relationship with their primary clients . . . .  
[T]he attorneys sought to be disqualified here have not 
changed sides from a former client to a current, adverse 
client . . . .  [A]t all times Weil, Gotshal and Leva, Hawes 
represented [DGF’s and its affiliates’] interests.  Any 
representation of Walston was done with Walston’s 
knowledge that the firms were still representing [DGF’s and 
its affiliates’] interests and would continue to do so. Weil, 
Gotshal and Leva, Hawes never changed sides.53 
 
The court thus affirmed the district court’s decision not to 
disqualify the law firms.54  The Allegaert court never reached the 
substantial relationship question, although it did note the trustee’s failure 
to argue that Weil, Gotshal and Leva, Hawes failed to reveal and explain 
their potential conflict of interest.55  Having raised the point, however, 
the Allegaert court quickly dispelled any notion that such a claim might 
be viable based on the fact that “the parties were not only aware of their 
mutual relationship, but also were as sophisticated, perhaps, as the 
American corporate community can be.”56 
Several courts have followed Allegaert,57 and some of those courts 
have gone beyond the issue of client confidences to examine the 
problems posed by lawyers’ duty of loyalty under Canon 5 and Rule 
1.9,58 which the Allegaert court did not reach.  The most interesting of 
those cases for present purposes is American Special Risk Insurance Co. 
v. Delta American Re Insurance Co.59 
American Special Risk
 was a complex breach of contract action 
arising out of various reinsurance contracts entered into by plaintiff 
American Special Risk Insurance Corp. (ASRIC) and defendant Delta 
                                                          
 53. Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. (referring to Canon 5 of the Model Code). 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Warburg Dillon Read, No. 99 Civ. 10525 (NRB), 2001 WL 
504876, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2001); Host Marriott Corp. v. Fast Food Operators, Inc., 891 F. 
Supp. 1002, 1006-08 (D. N.J. 1995) (discussing Rule 1.9(a)); Kempner v. Oppenheimer & Co., 662 
F. Supp. 1271, 1276-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); American Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 
634 F. Supp. 112, 120-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); C.A.M. v. E.B. Marks Music, Inc., 558 F. Supp. 57, 59 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Anderson v. Pryor, 537 F. Supp. 890, 895-96 (W.D. Mo. 1982). 
 58. Skidmore, 2001 WL 504876, at ** 4-5; Kempner, 662 F. Supp. at 1278-80; Am. Special 
Risk, 634 F. Supp. at 121-22. 
 59. American Special Risk, 634 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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American Re Insurance Co. (Delta).  An additional defendant in 
ASRIC’s suit against Delta was DR Insurance (DRI).  The law firm of 
Le Boeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae (Le Boeuf) represented ASRIC.60  
During the events leading up to the litigation, DRI had assumed 
responsibility for Delta’s reinsurance obligations.61  Problems arose 
because Delta hired Le Boeuf to represent it in unrelated administrative 
proceedings in Kentucky after Le Boeuf had sued it on ASRIC’s behalf 
in New York.62 
Delta and DRI moved to disqualify Le Boeuf in the New York 
litigation despite the fact that Delta did not believe itself to be adverse to 
ASRIC in the New York litigation and did not expect Le Boeuf to 
withhold its secrets from ASRIC.63  The American Special Risk court 
easily dispatched any hope of disqualification on shared confidence 
grounds, stating: “Delta cannot hire its opponent’s law firm and then 
disqualify the firm to protect confidences it may have imparted to the 
firm’s attorneys.”64  Relying in large part on Allegaert, the court 
concluded that the substantial relationship test and Canon 4 did not 
apply to Le Boeuf’s representation of Delta.65 
The American Special Risk court noted that “a more vexing 
problem [was] presented by the fact that Le Boeuf [was] ostensibly 
suing its own client.”66  The court resolved this problem by looking to 
DRI’s assumption of Delta’s reinsurance obligations.  Because DRI had 
assumed its contractual obligations, Delta was “only a nominal party” 
which “could not be injured by Le Boeuf’s dual representation.”67  
Accordingly, and because Delta had hired Le Boeuf after the firm had 
sued it on ASRIC’s behalf, the court concluded that Le Boeuf need not 
be disqualified for suing a client.68 
A Pennsylvania federal court embraced the accommodation client 
concept in In re Rite Aid Corp. Securities Litigation.69  In March 1999, 
pharmacy giant Rite Aid announced disappointing earnings and, when 
                                                          
 60. Id. at 113. 
 61. Id. at 116. 
 62. Id. at 121. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Am. Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 112, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 122. 
 68. Id. 
 69. In re Rite Aide Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 649 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
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its stock price fell dramatically as a result, it was sued by shareholders in 
several class actions.  The suits initially named as defendants Rite Aid 
and its CEO, Martin Grass.  Rite Aid’s General Counsel, Elliot Gerson, 
retained Alan Davis of the law firm of Ballard Spahr to represent both 
Rite Aid and Grass.70  At the time he retained Davis and Ballard Spahr, 
Gerson had also retained the law firm of Wilmer Culter & Pickering to 
represent Grass personally after the Wall Street Journal published an 
article indicating that Grass had entered into several transactions 
involving Rite Aid that benefitted him and his family.71 
Davis memorialized his representation of Rite Aid and Grass in an 
engagement letter to Gerson.  Davis explained to Gerson in the 
engagement letter that while there did not appear to be a conflict of 
interest that would prevent Ballard Spahr from representing both the 
company and Grass, it was possible that such a conflict might arise in 
the future.72  If it did, Davis wrote, it was “understood” that Grass would 
retain separate counsel and that Ballard Spahr would continue to 
represent Rite Aid.73 
Shortly after Davis sent Gerson his engagement letter, new class 
action complaints were filed.  These new suits also named Rite Aid 
executives Frank Bergonzi and Timothy Noonan as defendants.74  
Gerson asked Ballard Spahr to represent Bergonzi and Noonan on the 
same terms as its representation of Rite Aid and Grass.  Ballard Spahr 
thus entered its appearance for Rite Aid, Grass, Bergonzi and Noonan.75 
In October 1999, Davis learned that Grass and Bergonzi had 
engaged in conduct that apparently breached their fiduciary duties to 
Rite Aid.  Davis told Gerson that he and his firm could no longer 
represent Bergonzi and Grass.  He also advised Bergonzi that he could 
no longer represent him and urged him to replace Ballard Spahr with 
personal counsel.76  Bergonzi heeded Davis’ advice.  Finally, Davis told 
Wilmer Culter of the conflict and that Ballard Spahr could no longer 
represent Grass.77 
The litigation proceeded and, for more than one year, Grass did not 
                                                          
 70. Id. at 652. 
 71. Id. at 653 
 72. Id. at 652-53 (quoting engagement letter). 
 73. Id. at 653(quoting engagement letter). 
 74. Id. 
 75. In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 653. 
 76. Id. at 654 
 77. Id. 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss1/3
RICHMOND1.DOC 1/8/02  1:29 PM 
2001] ACCOMMODATION CLIENTS 71 
 
object to Ballard Spahr’s continued representation of Rite Aid.78  Davis 
finally settled the case on behalf of Rite Aid in November 2000, but that 
settlement did not encompass any of the individual defendants or Rite 
Aid’s accountants.79  Grass and Bergonzi objected to the settlement, 
arguing that the settlement was “the fruit of a tree poisoned by the 
allegedly unethical participation of Ballard Spahr in its negotiation and 
consummation.”80  They also moved to disqualify Ballard Spahr, 
although Bergonzi later withdrew from the dispute, leaving Grass to 
press the motion alone. 
Grass argued that Ballard Spahr, which had previously represented 
him in the litigation, had taken a position adverse to him by negotiating 
the partial settlement favoring Rite Aid, and that the firm did so without 
his consent.  Thus, Ballard Spahr clearly violated Rule 1.9(a) and should 
be disqualified.81  The Rite Aid court disagreed. 
The Rite Aid court pronounced that “Rite Aid was clearly the 
‘primary’ client.”82  This was particularly so because Ballard Spahr 
represented Grass through Rite Aid; the company engaged Ballard Spahr 
on Grass’s behalf, and the firm typically communicated with Grass 
through Gerson or in his presence.83  Ballard Spahr did not drop Grass as 
a client to represent a more desirable client in Rite Aid; any change in 
position was occasioned by Grass.84 
The court bolstered its conclusion that Ballard Spahr did not violate 
Rule 1.9(a) by looking to the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers,85 which countenances similar conduct by describing a client 
such as Grass as an “accommodation client.”86  Comment (i) to Section 




Withdrawal from representing an 
“accommodation” client.  With the informed consent of 
each client . . . a lawyer might undertake representation of 
another client as an accommodation to the lawyer’s regular 
client, typically for a limited purpose in order to avoid 
                                                          
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 655. 
 80. Id. at 652. 
 81. In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d at 656. 
 82. Id. at 658 (quoting Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 659. 
 86. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at § 132 cmt. i. 
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duplication of services and consequent higher fees.  If 
adverse interests later develop between the clients, even if 
the adversity relates to the matter involved in the common 
representation, circumstances might warrant the inference 
that the “accommodation” client understood and impliedly 
consented to the lawyer’s continuing to represent the 
regular client in the matter.  Circumstances most likely to 
evidence such an understanding are that the lawyer has 
represented the regular client for a long period of time 
before undertaking representation of the other client, that 
the representation was to be of limited scope and duration, 
and that the lawyer was not expected to keep confidential 
from the regular client any information provided to the 
lawyer by the other client . . . .  The lawyer bears the burden 
of showing that circumstances exist to warrant an inference 
of understanding and implied consent . . . .87 
 
The Rite Aid court believed that the dispute before it was analogous 
to the situation described in the Restatement comment.  It therefore 
deemed Grass to be an “accommodation client,” and inferred that he had 
consented to Ballard Spahr’s continued representation of Rite Aid after it 
had stopped representing him because of potential conflicts of interest.88 
Leaving aside Grass’s accommodation client status, it also was 
apparent that he had consented to Ballard Spahr’s continued 
representation of Rite Aid.  The nature and scope of Ballard Spahr’s 
engagement could not have been clearer.  Davis’ engagement letter to 
Gerson made it “pellucid that Ballard Spahr would, in the event of a 
conflict between Rite Aid and Grass, cease to represent Grass but 
continue to represent Rite Aid.”89  The court was unmoved by Grass’s 
claim that he never saw the letter, because his decision to engage 
counsel through Gerson bound him to the letter’s terms and as Rite Aid’s 
CEO he was constructively on notice of its contents.90 
Finally, and for good measure, the Rite Aid court concluded that 
Grass had waived his right to object to Ballard Spahr’s continued 
representation of the company.  There were a number of facts and 
circumstances that should have alerted Grass to any claimed conflict 
                                                          
 87. Id. 
 88. In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 649, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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long before the partial settlement in November 2000.91  Grass waited 
somewhere between nine and thirteen months from the time he 
reasonably should have been aware of Ballard Spahr’s conflict to file his 
motion to disqualify.92  He was represented by sophisticated independent 
counsel the entire time.  This delay was undue and easily constituted a 
waiver.93 
In Meyers v. Lipman,94 a recent opinion devoid of facts, a New 
York court hinted that it might endorse accommodation client status.  
Affirming the trial court’s denial of the appellants’ motion to disqualify 
the respondents’ attorneys, the Meyers court wrote: 
 
The motion was properly denied on the ground that 
appellants could not have reasonably expected that 
respondents’ attorneys would withhold from respondents 
information imparted by appellants in the context of 
litigation in which appellants and respondents were jointly 
represented by the attorneys and involving business entities 
in which appellants and respondents were jointly 
represented.95 
 
Unfortunately, the opinion is so factually deficient that it affords no 
real guidance.  A lawyer confronted with Meyers as unfavorable 
precedent can legitimately complain that it is vague to the point of being 
valueless. 
A Texas court rejected the accommodation client concept in 
Insurance Co. of North America v. Westergren.96  The attorney whose 
conduct was challenged in Westergren, James Harris, argued that he 
could represent a contractor in litigation against a surety, INA, even 
though he had earlier represented INA in substantially related matters in 
which the contractor was also a party.  Harris argued that there was no 
conflict of interest because his representation of INA was “merely an 
accommodation or pro forma relationship.”97  He did not consider INA 
to be his client because it did not pay his fees, and “at no time did he 
                                                          
 91. Id. at 660-62. 
 92. Id. at 661-62. 
 93. Id. at 662. 
 94. Meyers v. Lipman, 726 N.Y.S.2d 547 (App. Div. 2001). 
 95. Id. at 547. 
 96. Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Westergren, 794 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. App. 1990). 
 97. Id. at 815. 
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receive confidential information from or give advice to INA.”98  The 
trial court denied INA’s motion to disqualify Harris based on the lack of 
an attorney-client relationship and INA appealed. 
The appellate court acknowledged Harris’ accommodation or pro 
forma representation argument, but concluded that he shared an 
attorney-client relationship with INA.99  While the duties or specifics of 
the relationship might be disputed, the court could “find nothing in the 
disciplinary rules which permits a pro forma representation of a 
client.”100  The Westergren court thus held that the trial court erred in 
failing to disqualify Harris.101 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes102
 was a copyright action 
in which Time Warner sought to enjoin the defendants from posting on 
an Internet web site a computer program that allegedly defeated the 
encryption system used by Time Warner on its DVDs.  Time Warner 
moved to disqualify defendants’ new counsel, the Frankfurt firm, 
roughly one month after it entered its appearance on the ground that it 
was representing Time Warner in another case.103  The other case was 
known as Stouffer. 
Stouffer
 was another copyright case, albeit unrelated to Universal 
City.  In Stouffer, the Frankfurt firm represented Time Warner and two 
other clients, Scholastic and Rowling.  While Scholastic selected the 
Frankfurt firm as defense counsel and, in doing so, essentially foisted the 
firm on Time Warner, there was no doubt that Time Warner and 
Frankfurt shared an attorney-client relationship in that dispute.104 
Before moving to disqualify Frankfurt in the Universal City 
litigation, Time Warner called the Frankfurt partner handling the 
Stouffer
 case, Edward Rosenthal, to discuss the perceived conflict.105  
Rosenthal replied that there was no conflict of interest because the two 
matters were unrelated.  He suggested that Time Warner retain separate 
counsel in Stouffer if it was concerned about a conflict.106 
The Universal City court rejected Frankfurt’s argument that it could 
                                                          
 98. Id. at 814. 
 99. Id. at 815. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 103. Id. at 450-51 (discussing Scholastic, Inc. v. Stouffer, No. 99 Civ. 11480 (AGS), 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 11516 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2000)). 
 104. Universal City Studios, Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 453. 
 105. Id. at 451. 
 106. Id. 
16
Akron Law Review, Vol. 35 [2002], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol35/iss1/3
RICHMOND1.DOC 1/8/02  1:29 PM 
2001] ACCOMMODATION CLIENTS 75 
 
represent Time Warner in Stouffer and in the case before it because the 
cases were unrelated.  Once Frankfurt agreed to represent Time Warner 
along with Scholastic and Rowling in Stouffer, it surrendered its ability 
to represent another client in litigation against any of them.107  The court 
was also unimpressed with Frankfurt’s attempt to avoid disqualification 
by offering to withdraw from Time Warner’s representation in Stouffer.  
The court suggested that if suing a current client was indeed a dramatic 
act of disloyalty by a lawyer, as some courts have concluded, the act of 
trying to drop a client so that the lawyer could pursue a newer and more 
attractive engagement was at least as offensive.108 
In an effort to address these issues, the Frankfurt firm submitted a 
declaration by Cornell Law School Professor Charles W. Wolfram.  
Relying on Allegaert and the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers, Professor Wolfram opined that Time Warner was “a ‘non-
primary’ or ‘accommodation’ client, that only ‘primary’ clients may 
seek disqualification of counsel affected with conflicts, and in any case 
that a lawyer representing a non-primary client ‘can drop the 
accommodation client (like a hot potato, or otherwise) and file suit 
against the former accommodation client.’”109  Professor Wolfram did 
not defend Frankfurt’s concurrent representations for and against Time 
Warner.110  Rather, he stated only that disqualification is an 
inappropriate remedy when the aggrieved client is an accommodation 
client.111 
The Universal City court rejected Professor Wolfram’s opinion for 
at least two reasons.  First, his opinion rested on a series of inaccurate 
factual assumptions.  Professor Wolfram assumed that Time Warner 
assumed that Frankfurt’s ultimate allegiance was to Scholastic in the 
event of a conflict between the two companies; that Time Warner could 
not reasonably expect that Frankfurt would keep its confidences from 
Scholastic; that Time Warner had no economic stake in Stouffer because 
its interests were fully protected by virtue of a contract of indemnity 
with Scholastic; that Time Warner was named as a plaintiff in Stouffer 
only at Scholastic’s direction and played only a minor role in the case; 
and that Time Warner played no part in directing counsel’s activities in 
                                                          
 107. Id. at 453. 
 108. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 453-54. 
 111. Id. at 454. 
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Stouffer.112  These assumptions were either demonstrably wrong or 
unproven, or reflected unwarranted inferences drawn from claims or 
statements made by members of the Frankfurt firm.113 
Second, even if Time Warner were Frankfurt’s accommodation 
client in Stouffer in the sense that Professor Wolfram used the term, that 
did not mean that Frankfurt was entitled to drop its representation when 
it “found a case more to its liking.”114  To allow a lawyer to fire a client 
for the lawyer’s own advantage would offend “Canon 5’s requirement of 
the lawyer’s obligation of utmost fidelity to the client.”115  The 
Universal City
 court thus concluded that Professor Wolfram’s reliance 
on Allegaert was misplaced, as there the issue was a former client 
relationship and the Canon 4 requirement that lawyers preserve their 
clients’ confidences.116 
The fact that the Frankfurt firm had acted improperly in 
representing the defendants in Universal City despite its representation 
of Time Warner in Stouffer did not mean, however, that the firm should 
be disqualified.117  The Universal City court believed that Time 
Warner’s disqualification motion was motivated at least in part by 
tactical considerations.118  Time Warner waited nearly one month after 
learning of Frankfurt’s conflict before moving to disqualify the firm.  
Moreover, there was no indication that Frankfurt’s disloyalty would taint 
the litigation or prejudice Time Warner.119  The court thus denied Time 
Warner’s disqualification motion, while stating ominously that “[t]he 
proper place for this controversy is in the appropriate professional 
disciplinary body.”120 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Allegaert v. Perot121 does not 
broadly authorize the recognition of accommodation clients as a new 
subcategory of clients.  The case should be limited to its facts, as several 
                                                          
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114.  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 115. Id. at 454-55. 
 116. Id. at 454. 
 117. Id. at 455. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 455-56. 
 120.  Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 98 F. Supp. 2d 449, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 121. Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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courts have recognized.122  Additionally, the case was decided by 
application of Canon 4 of the Model Code, which specifically deals with 
client confidences,123 rather than under the broader Model Rule 1.9(a).  
While certainly intended to protect client confidences, Rule 1.9(a) also 
safeguards public confidence in the legal system and a client’s broader 
expectation of his lawyer’s loyalty.124  The Allegaert court did not 
address lawyers’ duty of loyalty in successive representations.125  
Finally, Allegaert should find no application in concurrent adverse 
representations. 
A lawyer may take on the representation of a second client in a 
matter at the request of a regular client.  That means only that the lawyer 
represents co-clients.  There is not a category of inferior clients known 
as accommodation clients to whom lawyers owe diminished professional 
duties.  The Restatement’s126 apparent creation of such a breed of client 
is at best an ill-considered description of some attorney-client 
relationships that are characterized by unusual facts or defined by well-
crafted engagement letters. 
There is no need for the potential confusion the accommodation 
client moniker creates.  A lawyer who wishes to avoid a disqualifying 
conflict in the representation of multiple clients often can avoid trouble 
by obtaining the clients’ consent,127 and by detailing the scope and 
nature of his representation of each client in a clear and thorough 
engagement letter.128  If a lawyer does these things and is thus able to 
continue to represent a favored client after withdrawing from the 
representation of a second client, that does not retroactively transform 
the second client into an “accommodation client.”  The second client is 
nothing more than a former client who has waived the lawyer’s conflict 
of interest.  The second client has, for whatever reason, decided that any 
advantage to be gained by insisting on his lawyer’s loyalty is 
                                                          
 122. See, e.g., Universal City, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 454; Koch v. Koch Indus., 798 F. Supp. 1525, 
1534 (D. Kan. 1992); Prisco v. Westgate Ent., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 266, 271 (D. Conn. 1992); Straub 
Clinic & Hosp. v. Kochi, 917 P.2d 1284, 1290-91 (Haw. 1996). 
 123. MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at Canon 4 (“A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences 
and Secrets of a Client”). 
 124. Koch, 798 F. Supp. at 1534; Prisco, 799 F. Supp. at 271. 
 125. Koch, 798 F. Supp. at 1534. 
 126. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, at § 132 cmt. i. 
 127. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 8, at Rule 1.9(a) (“A lawyer who has formerly 
represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a 
substantially related matter in which that person’s interests are materially adverse to the interests of 
the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.”) (emphasis added). 
 128. See, e.g., In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 139 F. Supp. 2d 649, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
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outweighed by other considerations. 
If accommodation client status is thought to be characterized by the 
accommodation client’s assumed or implied expectation or 
understanding that his confidences may pass to the primary client 
through their common lawyer, courts should ask why that is significant, 
or how it is important.  Model Rule 1.6(a) provides in pertinent part: 
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a 
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures 
that are impliedly authorized to carry out the representation, . . . .129 
A lawyer may be impliedly authorized to share a client’s 
information with a co-client in any case in which the clients are 
mounting a joint defense.  If that happens in a case in which one of the 
clients is the defense lawyer’s regular client and the other client is not, 
that does not mean that the lawyer owes the second client any less 
loyalty.  Moreover, in order for the second (accommodation) client to 
have impliedly authorized the lawyer’s disclosure of his confidences, he 
must have understood that the possibility of disclosure existed.130  To 
presume that the so-called accommodation client could have no 
reasonable expectation of confidentiality vis-à-vis the would-be primary 
client is to ignore the lawyer’s duty under Model Rule 1.4(b) to explain 
confidentiality principles and the concept of impliedly authorized 
disclosures to both clients.131  Communication is critical here, as the 
New Jersey Supreme Court explained in A. v. B.:132 
 
[A]n attorney, on commencing joint representation of 
co-clients, should agree explicitly with the clients on the 
sharing of confidential information.  In such a “disclosure 
agreement,” the co-clients can agree that any confidential 
information concerning one co-client, whether obtained 
from a co-client himself or herself or from another source, 
will be shared with the other co-client.  Similarly, the co-
clients can agree that unilateral confidences or other 
                                                          
 129. MODEL RULES, supra note 8, at Rule 1.6(a). 
 130. This conclusion is mandated by common sense and the commentary to Rule 1.6, which 
provides: “A lawyer is impliedly authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in 
carrying out the representation, except to the extent that the client’s instructions or special 
circumstances limit that authority.”  Id. at Rule 1.6 cmt. 7 (emphasis added).  A client obviously 
cannot limit his lawyer’s impliedly authorized disclosures unless he knows of the possibility. 
 131. Id. at Rule 1.4(b) (“A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to 
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.”). 
 132. A. v. B., 726 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1999). 
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confidential information will be kept confidential by the 
attorney.  Such a prior agreement will clarify the 
expectations of the clients and the lawyer and diminish the 
need for future litigation.133 
 
It is also important to understand that Rule 1.9(a) may bar 
successive representations even where the lawyer gained no confidences 
in the first representation or where the confidences have been publicly 
disclosed.134  This is because the Rule 1.9 substantial relationship test “is 
concerned with both a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality and his duty of 
loyalty.”135  It is therefore unwise to make the expected sharing of 
confidential information the sole or critical base for accommodation 
client recognition and related disqualification decisions. 
Finally, the recognition of accommodation client status runs 
contrary to long-standing principles of client loyalty in concurrent 
representations.  Absent prior consent, a lawyer cannot accept a new 
representation adverse to an existing client.136  A lawyer cannot simply 
discontinue an existing representation in order to represent a more 
favored client.137  As the court in Picker International, Inc. v. Varian 
Associates, Inc.,138
 observed: “A firm may not drop a client like a hot 
potato, especially if it is in order to keep happy a far more lucrative 
client.”139  Yet that is exactly what proponents of accommodation client 
status would permit lawyers to do. 
In this day of transient client loyalty the “hot potato” issue is 
increasingly important.140  A lawyer understandably may want to convert 
an existing client to a former client out of economic self-interest, and 
deeming the existing client to be an accommodation client may be the 
means to accomplish this goal.  It remains unreasonable, however, to 
endorse the accommodation client concept.  The simple fact is that some 
clients impose an opportunity cost on lawyers measured by the new 
clients that the lawyer cannot accept while representing the original 
                                                          
 133. Id. at 929. 
 134. Centerline Indus., Inc. v. Knize, 894 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. App. 1995). 
 135. Id. (citing In re Am. Airlines Inc., 972 F.2d 605, 619 (5th Cir. 1992)). 
 136. See MODEL RULES, supra note 8, at Rules 1.7(a) and (b); MODEL CODE, supra note 30, at 
EC 5-16. 
 137. Stratagem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int’l N.V., 756 F. Supp. 789, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 138. Picker Int’l Inc. v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ohio 1987). 
 139. Id. at 1365. 
 140. ROTUNDA, supra note 17, § 8-5, at 207. 
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client.141  This means that lawyers should be selective when accepting 
new business; it does not justify the creation of a new class of clients 
whose lesser business worth arguably leaves them at their lawyers’ 
mercy. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There clearly are cases of dual representation where the 
disqualification of the clients’ common lawyer would be unfair to one of 
the clients, to the lawyer, or both.  A lawyer’s professional discipline 
and exposure to malpractice liability in cases of dual representation can 
also be unfair.  And, these cases may involve one client who has a long-
time relationship with the lawyer, a situation where the lawyer’s 
representation of the second client is limited in duration or scope, and 
circumstances in which the second client does not expect that the lawyer 
will keep his confidences inviolate.  That does not mean, however, that 
the “accommodation client” is anything less than an ordinary client, or 
should be treated differently under ethics rules or the law of lawyering.  
Courts deciding disqualification motions in such cases can avoid any 
threatened unfairness by examining the facts and applying established 
legal principles.  A court that believes a disqualification motion has been 
filed to gain some sort of tactical advantage in the case can always 
exercise its discretion to deny the motion for that reason.  To create a 
new breed of client – the accommodation client – in an effort to avoid 
unfairness is unnecessary and confusing.  Worse yet it is imprudent, 
because it makes it too easy to excuse lawyers’ ethical failures.  Clients’ 
expectations of confidentiality and loyalty are worthy of protection in all 
representations. 
Lawyers can head off the problems that accommodation client 
status is intended to avoid or mitigate by crafting appropriate 
engagement letters or by obtaining appropriate waivers.142  If a lawyer 
fails to explain matters to his clients or fails to memorialize his 
agreements with his clients, he ought to expect that there may be 
unfortunate consequences. 
 
                                                          
 141. Id. 
 142. See, e.g., Zador Corp. v. Kwan, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754, 762-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
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